Systemic Risk and User-Level Performance in Private P2P Communities by Jia, Adele L. et al.
1Systemic risk and user-level performance in
private P2P communities
Adele L. Jia, Rameez Rahman, Tama´s Vinko´, Johan A. Pouwelse, and Dick H.J. Epema.
Abstract—Many peer-to-peer communities, including private BitTorrent communities that serve hundreds of thousands of users, utilize
credit-based or sharing ratio enforcement schemes to incentivize their members to contribute. In this paper, we analyze the performance
of such communities from both the system-level and the user-level perspectives. We show that both credit-based and sharing ratio
enforcement policies can lead to system-wide “crunches” or “crashes” where the system seizes completely due to too little or to too
much credit, respectively. We present a theoretical model that identifies the conditions that lead to these system pathologies and we
design an adaptive credit system that automatically adjusts credit policies to maintain sustainability. Given private communities that
are sustainable, it has been demonstrated that they are greatly oversupplied in terms of excessively high seeder-to-leecher ratios.
We further analyze the user-level performance by studying the effects of oversupply. We show that although achieving an increase
in the average downloading speed, the phenomenon of oversupply has three undesired effects: long seeding times, low upload
capacity utilizations, and an unfair playing field for late entrants into swarms. To alleviate these problems, we propose four different
strategies, which have been inspired by ideas in social sciences and economics. We evaluate these strategies through simulations and
demonstrate their positive effects.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In decentralized collaborative systems, including peer-
to-peer (P2P) systems, providing incentives for user to
contribute is essential. The well-known P2P file-sharing
protocol BitTorrent owes its success to its Tit-For-Tat
(TFT) incentive policy, which works reasonably well in
fostering cooperation among downloaders (also known
as leechers). However, TFT does not provide incentives
for peers to remain in the system after their downloads
are complete in order to seed the entire file. Therefore,
peers are free to engage in “Hit and Run” behavior,
leaving immediately upon completing their downloads.
To provide an incentive for seeding, in recent years
there has been a proliferation of so-called private BitTor-
rent communities. These communities employ private
trackers that maintain centralized accounts and record the
download and upload activity of each user. They apply
policies to incentivize good overall upload / download
behavior. One such well-known policy is Sharing Ratio
Enforcement (SRE), in which each member is required
to keep its sharing ratio (the ratio between its total
amounts of upload and download) at least equal to a
threshold called the SRE threshold, which is set by the
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community administrator. Community members whose
sharing ratios drop below the threshold are first warned
and then banned from downloading, or even expelled
from the community. Another such policy is the credit-
based policy, which requires each member to maintain a
positive credit (its total amount of upload minus its total
amount of download). In this paper we explore both the
system-level dynamics and the user-level performance
in communities adopting such policies.
Considering a private community as an economic sys-
tem, we analyze its system-level dynamics by studying
its potential systemic risk. In economics, systemic risk
is the risk of a collapse of an entire economic system
or market [13]. We find that in private communities, too
much credit distributed too evenly leads to a crash in
which peers hold abundant credit and are not willing to
contribute. Hence, the system seizes to zero throughput
containing only leechers. Conversely, too little credit
distributed over the peers leads to a crunch in which
peers do not have enough credit to download, leading
to a seized system containing only seeders1.
Even when crashes or crunches do not occur, i.e.,
when the system is sustainable, this only ensures that the
system is able to function, but not how well it functions.
Though many measurement studies [7], [15], [16], [21]
have shown that the SRE-based and credit-based policies
1. A real world example of the crash and crunch is the story of the
Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op [11], which was a group of parents
who agreed to cooperate to babysit. A crunch happened when most
people wanted to save up coupons: they looked for an opportunity to
babysit but there was little demand. Later when more coupons were
issued a crash happened: most people felt they had enough coupons
so they did not want to babysit, leaving the system with huge demand
but no supply.
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Fig. 1. The CDF of the sharing ratios in CHDBits.org.
are very effective in boosting contribution levels in terms
of high seeder-to-leecher ratios and the corresponding
high downloading speeds, we argue that the abundant
supply of bandwidth also has several negative effects
such as excessively long seeding times that are often
unproductive. To explore this, we analyze the user-level
performance in sustainable private communities.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. We demonstrate that in private communities credit
crashes and crunches can occur and we identify condi-
tions that lead to these extreme outcomes (Section 4);
2. We present a theoretical model that predicts whether
a system will crash, crunch, or be sustainable over a
defined time horizon. Based on this model we propose
an adaptive credit policy that helps the system to avoid
crashes and crunches (Section 5);
3. We show that users in sustainable private commu-
nities achieve high downloading speeds but are forced
to seed for excessively long times, during which their
upload capacity utilizations are quite low (Section 6).
Further, when the popularity of a swarm decreases over
time, peers that join the swarm not early enough will
have to seed much longer than peers who join (strategi-
cally) at the beginning of the swarm (Section 8);
4. We propose and evaluate four new strategies that
alleviate these problems while still maintaining a reason-
able system-wide downloading speed (Sections 7 and 8).
We use private BitTorrent communities as an example,
but our analysis is applicable to any system that adopts
contribution enforcement policies, by generalizing the
metrics for determining the credit and the sharing ratio
from the upload and download amounts to any metrics
representing contribution and consumption.
2 REAL WORLD OBSERVATIONS
To support our later analysis, we first present real world
observations of two private communities, CHDBits.org
[2] and Bitsoup.org [3]. CHDBits and Bitsoup both re-
quire the users to maintain sharing ratios larger than
the threshold of 0.7. The trackers of CHDBits collect in-
formation that is periodically reported by the BitTorrent
clients of its users, which is displayed in the form of
HTML pages available to only its users. We crawled
these trackers in May 2011. For each user in CHDBits,
we collected the information on its user profile page
including the upload and download amount, the seeding
time, and the sharing ratio. For each torrent, we collected
the information of its published date, and its numbers
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(b) The CDF of the seeder-to-
leecher ratio in swarms with at
least one leecher
Fig. 2. Oversupply in CHDBits swarms.
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Fig. 3. The CDF of the fraction of idle seeding time of
peers with sharing ratios smaller than 1 in BitSoup.org.
of seeders and leechers at the time of snapshot. In total,
information on all the 31,547 registered users and 40,040
torrents was obtained. For Bitsoup, we use the traces
published in [5] that report the user activity of 84,007
users in 13,741 torrents during a period of two months.
2.1 The existence of over-seeding behavior
In CHDBits, maintaining a sharing ratio slightly above
the SRE threshold is sufficient for a user to start down-
loading a new file. However, we observe that not all the
users behave like this. As shown in Fig. 1, more than 95%
of the users in CHDBits keep sharing ratios higher than
0.7 and more than 50% of the users keep them higher
than 2. This phenomenon of peers seeding more than
required and achieving sharing ratios that are (much)
higher than the SRE threshold has also been observed in
many other communities [15].
From the above observation we abstract two user
behaviors for our later analysis, lazy-seeding and over-
seeding. Lazy-seeding peers seed the minimum amount
required by the enforcement policies. They represent the
users who are download-oriented, i.e., who only seed
enough to maintain adequate sharing ratios or credit to
be able to start new downloads. On the other hand, over-
seeding peers are deposit-oriented, and always maintain
sharing ratios (much) higher than required. The behavior
of such peers may be triggered by various motivations
such as altruism, a desire to be part of the rich elite
of the community, or a habit of storing credit for the
future. In line with the terminology used in economics,
over-seeding peers can be understood as hoarders as their
behavior essentially amounts to hoarding credit.
2.2 The oversupply
The main motivation for implementing credit or SRE
policies is to close the gap between bandwidth demand
3and supply as observed in public BitTorrent commu-
nities, where there is significantly more demand than
supply [16]. However, the presence of over-seeding peers
completely reverses the situation and in private commu-
nities, swarms tend to be extremely oversupplied.
At the time of the crawling, CHDBits had 33,041 active
swarms (with at least one leecher or one seeder), among
which 26,402 swarms (79.9%) had no leechers at all! As
shown in Fig. 2(a), 40% of the swarms with no leechers
still had at least 5 seeders, and for swarms with at least
1 leecher, the seeder-to-leecher ratio (SLR) is quite high:
as shown in Fig. 2(b), 50% (5%) of these swarms had an
SLR of at least 6 (30). We see clearly that a majority of
the swarms are heavily oversupplied. Therefore, in such
swarms, intuitively it is difficult for seeders to perform
any actual uploads. We validate our speculation through
the following observation.
2.3 Unproductive seeding
It is clear that in order to achieve high sharing ratios,
peers need to spend considerable amount of seeding
time. In the case of over-seeding peers, long seeding
times are to be expected. However, we observe that
even many peers with small sharing ratios suffer from
excessively long seeding times, and a significant part of
their seeding time is spent idle without being able to
upload anything to others. As a consequence, they have
to wait for a long period until their sharing ratios are
high enough to start new downloads.
Fig. 3 shows the CDF of the fraction of idle seeding
time of peers with sharing ratios smaller than 1 in Bit-
Soup. We see that 10% of these peers spend at least half
of their seeding time idle. Note that Fig. 3 only shows the
fraction of idle seeding time. It can be conjectured that
the fraction of seeding time that is not completely idle
yet still yields very low upload speed, would be much
higher. We term this situation as unproductive seeding and
we hypothesize that it is due to the oversupply under
credit-based or SRE-based schemes.
3 MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section we explain the credit-based and SRE-
based incentive policies, and our model of communities
that employ one of these policies.
3.1 Credit-based versus SRE-based policies
Credit-based and SRE-based policies are essentially very
similar, in a way that they can be understood as varia-
tions of each other. The idea behind both policies is that
every peer has to maintain a certain relation between
the total amount u(t) it has uploaded and the total
amount d(t) it has downloaded since it entered the
community until time t. The credit-based policy requires
users to keep non-negative credit, i.e., to ensure that
u(t)−d(t) ≥ 0, while the SRE-based policy requires users
to keep a minimum sharing ratio SR(t) = u(t)/d(t), i.e.,
to ensure that SR(t) ≥ α, where α is the SRE threshold.
Throughout this paper we assume α ≤ 1, as most private
communities do [3], [1]. When α = 1 in the SRE policy,
the SRE-based and credit-based policies coincide.
By enforcing non-negative credit in the credit-based
policy, the exchanging of data by peers does not gen-
erate new credit, and the total amount of credit in the
community is always equal to zero (or to the sum of the
initial credits allocated to the peers by the community
administrator). In contrast, an SRE-based policy allows
users to have negative credit (i.e., to have u(t)−d(t) < 0,
which means that SR(t) < 1). Holding negative credit
increases the amount of credit among the peers with
positive credit in the system—in other words, by holding
negative credit a user is essentially minting credit. More
precisely, the total credit minted by a user in an SRE-
based community with SR(t) < 1 until time t is:
d(t)− u(t) = (1− SR(t))d(t), (1)
which is bounded by (1 − α)d(t). As the sharing
ratios of peers fluctuate, SRE-based communities hold
a dynamic amount of credit circulating in the system.
3.2 The basic model
We consider a community that is either credit-based
or SRE-based. The community comprises a set of s
swarms2 each associated with a file of size F (expressed
in number of pieces or units), and a set of N peers
each with upload capacity U .3 We assume no limit on
the download capacity of peers. The download model
follows the TFT mechanism in BitTorrent, with seeders
uploading units to leechers and leechers exchanging
units with each other. In reality, a peer can participate
in multiple swarms simultaneously, with its bandwidth
shared among all the swarms. However, since the shar-
ing ratio is aggregated over all the swarms, we assume
that at any time a peer only participates in one swarm,
either as a leecher or a seeder.
The operation of the model is based on cycles rep-
resenting units of time. In every cycle, a peer either
uploads and/or downloads data or is idle, and at the
end of every cycle, it may switch swarms. Peers attempt
to download all s files in random order.
In a credit-based community, every peer p is initialized
with an amount Cp of credit, and in an SRE-based
community, every peer is initialized with a download
amount equal to F and a sharing ratio that is a uniformly
random number between 0 and 2. A peer can and will
only start leeching its next file if its credit or its sharing
2. We assume the number of swarms to be large enough that even
with no injection of new swarms, users still have enough swarms to
download from.
3. Since crashes and crunches are due to credit abundance and
shortage, respectively, bandwidth heterogeneity does not influence
whether a system will crash or crunch. However, it does influence
the user-level performance, for which we examine both bandwidth
homogeneous and heterogeneous systems in Section 6.
4ratio is at least equal to its target threshold, otherwise it
continues seeding the current file.
Based on real-world observations, we implement two
user behaviors: lazy-seeding and over-seeding (see de-
tails in Section 2.1). The target threshold of a lazy-
seeding peer is an amount F of credit in a credit-based
community (enough to start and complete leeching a
new file) and a sharing ratio equal to the SRE threshold
in an SRE-based community.
The condition for a lazy-seeding peer p at time t to
stop seeding is cp(t) ≥ 0, with:
cp(t) =
{
up(t)− dp(t) + Cp − F credit-based,
up(t)− αdp(t) SRE-based,
(2)
where up(t) and dp(t) represent the total amounts of
upload and download of peer p. Over-seeding peers
behave in a similar way, but in both credit-based and
SRE-based communities they aim at large sharing ratios.
Throughout this paper we choose a sharing ratio of 2
as the default target threshold for over-seeding peers.
We have run several tests using different values for the
threshold and the results show that the tendency of the
problem is the same.
4 SYSTEMIC RISK: CRASH AND CRUNCH
In this section, we explore the credit dynamics in pri-
vate communities and we analyze the conditions under
which a community will crash, crunch, or be sustainable.
We define a crash as a situation in which due to credit
abundance, peers are not incentivized to contribute and
the system completely seizes up, providing no upload or
download to any peers. We define a crunch as a situation
in which due to credit shortages, peers cannot afford
new downloads and the system seizes up. We define a
community to be sustainable if it does not crash or crunch.
4.1 Experimental setup
We consider a closed system without new peer arrivals.
Peer arrivals bring credit into the system and make
it difficult to identify whether the underlying credit
dynamics is due to the enforcement policy or to the new
credit. In fact, in reality many private communities are
(nearly) closed [2], [1]. For example, CHDBits hardly has
any open registration and new members can only be
admitted by extremely restricted invitation.
The simulation is based on the basic model introduced
in Section 3, with N = 1000, s = 100, F = 10 units,
and U = 4 units per cycle. The small file size means
the simulation runs produce results at a large scale of
granularity. We also performed runs with F = 100 and
found no significant difference in results. We choose
α = 0.7 as the default value of the SRE threshold, as it
is used in many private communities, e.g., [3], [1]. Tests
using different values for α show that the tendency of
the problem stays the same, but with different speeds
of entering crash or crunch. For each experiment we
perform 10 independent runs, and each run is executed
for 2000 cycles.
TABLE 1
Sustainability of the credit-based system.
frac.of rich avg.throughput avg.frac.of final
at start (std.dev) seeders (std.dev) state
0.1 0.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) crunch
0.3 0.218 (0.001) 0.953 (0.005) sustain
0.5 0.777 (0.002) 0.769 (0.018) sustain
0.7 0.968 (0.004) 0.506 (0.018) sustain
0.8 0.587 (0.478) 0.249 (0.204) sustain/crash
0.9 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) crash
4.2 Credit-based: constant credit
As discussed in Section 3, the amount of credit in a
credit-based community is always equal to the initial
credit allocated by the community administrators. In
this experiment, we vary the fraction of peers who are
given an initial credit of F (and other peers are given
zero credit), which we call rich peers, thus generating
different levels of credit in the system.
Table 1 shows the results of the system containing only
lazy-seeding peers. Here, the throughput is expressed
as the total amounts of units of data exchanged in the
system over an entire run, normalized to the highest
one observed in all the experiments. When the fraction
of rich peers is initialized to 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7, we see
sustainable outcomes with increasing throughput and
a smaller number of seeders. We have run extended
runs up to 20,000 cycles and find that the sustainable
outcomes are maintained. This is intuitive since as the
amount of credit in the system increases, fewer peers are
poor, and hence more exchange of data can occur.
When 10% of peers are initialized as rich, the sys-
tem crunches with all peers being seeders; and when
90% of peers are initialized as rich, the system crashes
with all peers being leechers. Inspection of individual
runs shows that crunches and crashes happen quickly—
within the first ten cycles or so. This is reflected in the
low (almost zero) throughput under crash and crunch
states. It is interesting to see that when the initial fraction
of rich peers is set to 0.8, both sustain and crash out-
comes can occur. This is reflected in the high variance of
the throughput. Here we are very close to the threshold
leading to a crash and we find path dependency based
on initial random conditions leading to either a high
sustainable throughput, or a sudden crash otherwise.
When there is any number of over-seeding peers, we
find that the system eventually crunches, and the speed
of the crunch depends on the number of over-seeding
peers. This is intuitive since in our experiments, over-
seeding peers seed (to hoard credit) until they have a
sharing ratio larger than 2—they eventually hold all the
credit in the system and a crunch is inevitable.
4.3 SRE-based: dynamic credit
As discussed above, a credit-based community keeps a
delicate constant amount of credit which, if not properly
set, will lead the system to crunch or crash. On the other
hand, as stated in Section 3, an SRE-based system keeps
dynamic credit by allowing peers with sharing ratios less
5than one to mint some credit. Hence, essentially lazy-
seeding peers in an SRE-based community inject credit
into circulation, and as in a credit-based community,
over-seeding peers absorb credit from circulation.
Intuitively, an SRE-based system cannot be sustainable
if all peers are lazy-seeding: soon they will inject too
much credit into circulation, which eventually leads the
system to a crash. However, with the existence of over-
seeding peers who absorb credit from circulation, the
effect of credit-injecting by lazy-seeding peers can be al-
leviated and the system might eventually be sustainable.
We run several simulations to validate the above
hypotheses. We consider an SRE-based system in which
we vary the fraction of over-seeding peers. As shown
in Table 2, a certain fraction of over-seeding peers (0.3
and 0.4 in our experimental settings) does lead the SRE-
based community to be sustainable. A too small or a
too large fraction of over-seeding peers (0.1 and 0.5 in
our experimental settings), on the other hand, eventually
leads the system to crash or crunch.
5 AVOIDING CRASHES AND CRUNCHES
In this section, we derive (approximate) conditions for
predicting crunches and crashes and we design a novel
adaptive credit intervention mechanism for maintaining the
sustainability.
5.1 Predicting crashes and crunches
In the model introduced in Section 3, suppose that at
time t, a swarm ` has x`(t) leechers and y`(t) seeders.
Denoting the fraction of the file that a leecher x`i still
has to download by p`i(t), x
`
i needs to spend an amount
α(1− p`i(t))F of credit to finish its download. We define
L`i(t) and R
`
i(t) as the sets of peers that have fewer or
more pieces of the file than peer i, respectively (for a
seeder y`(t), L`i(t) consists of all leechers and R
`
i(t) is
empty). We assume that peer i only downloads from
peers in R`i(t), and only uploads to peers in L
`
i(t) (this is
not quite true in BitTorrent, which makes the conditions
that we will derive approximations). We further assume
that the credit paid by peer i is equally shared by all
peers in R`i(t). Hence, if the situation (in terms of Li(t)
and Ri(t)) does not change from time t onward, peer
i can earn an amount Q`i(t) of credit from the peers in
L`i(t), where
Q`i(t) :=
∑
j∈L`
i
(t)
(1− p`j(t))F
|R`j(t)|
. (3)
Let X`(t) and Y`(t) respectively represent the sets of
leechers and seeders that, assuming that the situation
does not change from time t, are able to achieve their
target thresholds and start new downloads. Together
with Eq. (2), we have:
X`(t) :=
{
x`i : cx`
i
(t) +Q`i(t)− α(1 − p
`
i(t))F ≥ 0
}
,
Y`(t) :=
{
y`j : cy`j (t) +Q
`
j(t) ≥ 0
}
.
(4)
TABLE 2
Sustainability of the SRE-based system.
frac.of over avg.throughput avg.frac.of final
-seeding peers (std.dev) seeders (std.dev) state
0.1 0.0093 (0.0012) 0.0000 (0.0000) crash
0.2 0.2046 (0.2103) 0.0037 (0.0082) crash/sustain
0.3 0.8910 (0.0041) 0.1487 (0.0141) sustain
0.4 0.9865 (0.0090) 0.4212 (0.0243) sustain
0.5 0.1436 (0.0083) 1.0000 (0.0000) crunch
Now we estimate the remaining download time of
leechers and the remaining seeding time of seeders for
the current file. Here we assume that during the upload
process, leechers and seeders alike upload with their
full capacity U and distribute their upload capacity
equally across all the leechers they are uploading to. The
estimated remaining download time T `i (t) of leecher x
`
i
can be expressed as:
Tx`
i
(t) :=
(1− p`i(t))F∑
k∈R`
i
(t)
U
|L`
k
(t)|
. (5)
Similarly, the estimated remaining time for a seeder y`j
to achieve its target threshold and stop seeding is:
Ty`
j
(t) := max{0,−cy`
j
(t)}/U, (6)
where −cy`
j
(t) (if positive) represents the credit y`j still
needs to earn to achieve its target threshold.
We can now formulate the condition for a crunch to
happen in the system as the condition that the sets X`(t)
and Y`(t) are both empty for all swarms ` at some time
t, because that no leechers or seeders are able to earn
enough credit to leave their swarms. As a consequence,
by the time that the last leecher finishes its download,
there will be no exchange of credit in the whole system.
In order to formulate the condition for a crash to
happen, let P`(t) := {x
`
i : x
`
i /∈ X`(t)} be the set of
leechers in swarm ` who will need to seed after finishing
their current downloads in order to achieve their target
thresholds. Then the condition for a crash to happen is:
|Y`(t)| = y
`(t) and min
k∈P`(t)
Tx`
k
(t) > max
j∈Y`(t)
Ty`
j
(t), (7)
for all swarms ` at some time t. Note that the system
crashes if there are no seeders. The first part of the
condition above says that all the seeders in the system
will be able to earn enough credit to leave their swarms.
If in addition none of the leechers in P`(t) can finish
its download before the last existing seeder leaves the
swarm and if this happens to all the swarms (the second
part of the condition), then the whole system will end
up with no seeders and a credit crash will occur.
5.2 Adaptive credit for sustainability
We design a novel adaptive credit intervention mechanism
to avoid crashes and crunches. At each cycle, we check
the conditions for crunches and crashes derived in Sec-
tion 5.1. When the system is destined for a crunch, it
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Fig. 4. The normalized throughput and credit in the
system with the adaptive credit intervention mechanism.
applies freeleech4 where leechers do not pay any credit for
downloading, but seeders and other uploaders are still
credited for uploading. Hence, new credit is injected into
the system. Credit injection for stimulating the economy
has often been used successfully in real world situations
[19]. When the system is destined for a crash, it applies
freeseed where seeding peers (and uploading leechers) do
not receive any credit for uploading, but leechers still
pay credit for downloading. Hence, credit is removed
from the system. We use the credit-based system as
an example to evaluate our strategies, but the same
analysis can be applied to an SRE-based system. The
experimental setup is the same as in Section 4.
In a credit-based system containing only lazy-seeding
peers, all runs produce a sustainable outcome, including
those previously led to crunches and crashes, i.e., with
0.1 and 0.9 fraction of rich peers at start. Fig. 4.(a)
(Fig. 4.(b)) shows how a crunch (crash) is avoided via
the activation of freeleech (freeseed) at several cycles—
note the increase (decrease) in credit over time.
As stated in Section 4, any number of over-seeding
peers in a credit-based community will eventually lead
to a crunch. Fig. 5 shows the throughput in the system
with 1% peers being over-seeding—crunches are pre-
vented when the adaptive credit intervention mechanism
is applied. However, the throughput of the system in
the latter case is still very low, since the adaptive credit
intervention mechanism does not attempt to optimize
the system. In later sections we provide a more thorough
analysis on optimizing the system, i.e., improving the
user-level performance.
5.3 Discussion
While freeleech and freeseed policies effectively avoids
crunches and crashes, they temporarily suspend the
original incentive for contributions, which could lead to
reduced performance if users learn to game the system
by only downloading during freeleech periods and not
seeding during freeseed periods. A refinement that will
help preserve incentives is to reduce the freeseed and
freeleech “tax” amount: rather than having leechers not
pay anything at all for downloading and seeders not
being credited for uploading, they can be charged or
credited for a fraction, say 50%. Further, the taxation
4. Freeleech is sometimes also used in existing private communities
such as CHDBits, but in a more empirical manner.
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Fig. 5. The normalized throughput with and without the
adaptive credit intervention mechanism (50% rich peers).
amount can also be variable and be applied in a con-
tinuous fashion. We explore this later in Section 7.
Until now, we have analyzed the sustainability of a
P2P community that adopts a credit-based or SRE-based
policy. However, the sustainability of the system only
ensures that the system is able to function, but does
not guarantee it will function well (recall Fig. 5 for an
example of a sustainable system with low performance).
To explore this, in the following sections we analyze and
improve the user-level performance in sustainable P2P
communities. There, we take sharing ratio enforcement
as an example, but our analysis is also applicable to the
credit-based policy, since it is only a special case of SRE
with a threshold equal to one.
6 USER-LEVEL PERFORMANCE: THE POSI-
TIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF SRE
In this section we show the user-level performance under
SRE. Based on simulations we examine the influence of
several parameters and we exhibit the main reasons for
the positive and negative effects of SRE.
6.1 Experimental setup
In Section 4 we have shown that in closed private
communities crashes or crunches easily happen. It is
not worthwhile to analyze the user-level performance
in an unsustainable system. Hence, in this section we
consider an open system with peer arrivals. As stated
in Section 3.1 and 4.3, new peers bring credit into the
system and the increase of the credit level alleviates the
potential systemic risk. In reality, there are many private
communities with open registration, e.g., BitSoup [3],
and they can be considered as open systems.
We use the same simulator and consider the same
initial settings as in Section 3, except that now we
consider 100 initial peers and 5 swarms in the system.
In each cycle, new peers arrive according to a certain
arrival rate (1 or 10 peers per cycle in our simulations)
and they join a random swarm to download. After the
first download, they maintain a sharing ratio above their
target thresholds. Each peer (with upload capacity 1 unit
per cycle) attempts to download all the 5 files (with
size of 10 units) in the system, in random order. We
consider a bandwidth-homogeneous BitTorrent system
unless otherwise indicated. We run the simulation for
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Fig. 6. User-level performance under different fractions of lazy-seeding peers (LSP) and
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2000 cycles and keep a record of peers who finish
downloading all the files by the end of the simulation.
The results represent the average of 5 runs.
6.2 The imbalance of bandwidth supply and demand
In our first experiment we vary the fraction of over-
seeding peers, thus generating different levels of over-
supply. As shown in Fig. 6(a), with the fraction of over-
seeding peers increasing from 0.1 to 0.9, the average
downloading speed is increased nearly 10 times. How-
ever, the average upload capacity utilization is signif-
icantly deteriorated and the seeding time is increased
dramatically. With 50% over-seeding peers, on average
each peer can only utilize less than 20% of its upload ca-
pacity (Fig. 6(b)) and the seeding time of a lazy-seeding
peer is nearly 200 times more than its downloading time,
and for over-seeding peers, it even increases to over 400
times. On the other hand, with a smaller peer arrival
rate (which means a smaller demand) the imbalance
and hence the performance, are even worse. As shown
in Fig. 6, when the peer arrival rate decreases from 10
to 1 peer per cycle, with the same fraction of over-
seeding peers, the average upload capacity utilization
is decreased 2-3 times and the average seeding time is
increased 2-5 times.
6.3 The influence of the SRE threshold
Many communities [3], [1] use 0.7 as the default value
of the SRE threshold, empirically or intuitively. This
section complements the necessary analysis behind the
choice. Fig. 8 shows that with 50% over-seeding peers,
when the SRE threshold is increased from 0.2 to 0.9, the
upload capacity utilization decreases while the average
seeding time increases. Surprisingly, with 10% over-
seeding peers, the upload capacity utilization is first
increased and then decreased. We believe this is due
to, what we term as, the seeder’s dilemma: with either
a very small or a very large number of seeders, peers
cannot well-utilize their upload capacities. The former
case is due to the piece availability problem: When there
are not enough seeders, leechers have to exchange data
with each other, which is not always possible since they
only hold a part of the entire file. The latter case is due
to the insufficient download demand. Without enough
demand, though seeders have the will, they cannot find
enough leechers to upload to.
6.4 The discrimination against peers with limited
capacities
In this subsection, we analyze SRE’s effects in
bandwidth-heterogeneous systems. We simulate a sys-
tem with slow and fast peers. All the other settings are
the same as in previous experiments, except that the
upload capacity of fast (slow) peers is 4 (1) units per
cycle. We change the fraction of fast peers from 0.1 to
0.9 and the results are shown in Fig. 7. When 30% of the
peers are over-seeding, slow peers need to seed 200 to
500 cycles more than fast peers. In general, slow peers
need to seed 4 times as long as fast peers, which is the
same as the ratio between the upload capacity of a fast
and a slow peer. This result is also consistent with our
previous theoretical results [10].
While fast and slow peers both put all their effort in
participating in the community, slow peers need to seed
much longer. We term this as SRE’s discrimination against
low-capacity peers. Together with the long seeding time
and the low upload capacity utilization, the user-level
performance is deteriorated. In the following section, we
propose four strategies to alleviate these problems.
7 PROPOSED STRATEGIES
Inspired by ideas in social sciences and economics, in this
section we propose four strategies aimed at alleviating
the negative effects of incentive policies used in private
BitTorrent communities, which require only a minor
revision of those policies.
7.1 Strategy description
Negative taxation is used to describe the supplemental
pay from the government to people earning below a cer-
tain amount [9]. Under this strategy, the upload amount
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Fig. 9. Strategy performance under different fractions of lazy-seeding peers (LSP) and over-seeding peers (OSP).
of a peer is calculated as its actual upload amount mul-
tiplied by the coefficient T = max{min{1/SR, θ}, 1},
where SR represents its sharing ratio and θ represents
the maximum negative taxation degree. In fact, this strategy
reduces the SRE threshold individually for each peer to
only 1/T of the original one, where 1 ≤ T ≤ θ. To still
avoid free-riding to a reasonable extent, a small value of
θ is desirable. In our simulations we set θ = 2.
Welfare for the rich is used to describe the bestowal
of grants and tax-breaks to the wealthy [14]. Under this
strategy, the upload amount of a peer is calculated as
its actual upload amount multiplied by the coefficient
W = max{min{SR, ϕ}, 1}, where ϕ represents the
maximum welfare degree. In fact, this strategy reduces the
desired sharing ratio of an over-seeding peer to 1/W of
its original one, where 1 ≤ W ≤ ϕ. In this way, over-
seeding peers may achieve their desired sharing ratio
and leave oversupplied swarms sooner. To prevent they
leave too quickly, a small value of ϕ is desirable. In our
simulation we set ϕ = 2.
Remuneration according to effort is introduced in
participatory economics [4], where people are paid ac-
cording to the effort rather than the amount of contribu-
tion. Measuring the effort in terms of the seeding time,
we propose SRE with counting seeding time, where a peer
can start a new download when either it has achieved
the SRE threshold or it has seeded for a sufficiently long
time, which equals the size of the shared file divided
by its upload capacity in our simulation. In this way,
peers that are stuck in long seeding process in oversup-
plied swarms can leave and perform further downloads,
which helps to balance the bandwidth demand and
supply in the system. Note that since over-seeding peers
are deposit-oriented, they still start new downloads only
when they have achieved their desired sharing ratios.
Supply-based price. Taking inspiration from the law
of supply and demand [6], we propose SRE with supply-
based price, in which the download amount of a peer is
calculated as its actual download amount multiplied by
the price P = max{1/SLR, φ}. The price is inversely cor-
related with the supply in the swarm, which is measure
by the seeder-to-leecher ratio (SLR). In an oversupplied
swarm, a leecher pays less and it is less likely for it
to have an insufficient sharing ratio and thus stay as
a seeder. In this way, the oversupply is mitigated and
the strategy gives a way to escape out of the seeder’s
dilemma as described in Section 6.3. A similar argument
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Fig. 10. Alleviating discrimination.
is also applicable in an undersupplied swarm. Here,
φ represents the lowest price, which is used to prevent
strategic users to only join swarms with extreme low
prices. In our simulation we set φ = 0.1. Note that the
freeleech strategy proposed in Section 5.2 is an extreme
with the price equal to 0.
7.2 Strategy evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the new strategies
through simulations. The experimental setup is the same
as in Section 6 and results are shown in Figs. 9 and 10.
From Fig. 9 we see that by using any of the new
strategies, peers achieve higher upload capacity utiliza-
tions and shorter seeding times. Particularly, SRE with
supply-based price performs stably when the fraction
of over-seeding peers increases and it achieves the best
performance in reducing the seeding time for all peers,
which is reduced by three orders of magnitude. We
believe the main reason is that, as stated in Section
7.1, SRE with supply-based price adaptively adjusts the
supply and demand in a swarm.
While the seeding time is dramatically reduced, as a
trade-off, the average downloading speed is decreased
(Fig. 9(d)), hence the downloading time is increased.
However, given that in our simulations we consider
files with size equal to 10 units, the increase of the
downloading time (tens of cycles) is negligible com-
pared to the decrease of the seeding time (hundreds
or even thousands of cycles). Further, when the system
is consisted by both fast and slow peers, we see from
Fig. 10 that all the proposed strategies effectively alle-
viate SRE’s discrimination against low-capacity peers:
with 30% over-seeding peers, the difference between the
seeding times of fast and slow peers are reduced from
hundreds to tens of cycles.
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8 DYNAMIC FILE POPULARITY
So far, we have only considered scenarios in which all
files have the same constant popularity. However, many
measurement studies [5], [12] show that the popularity
of a file decreases quickly after it is first published. In
this section, we analyze the effects of SRE and evaluate
our proposed strategies under dynamic file popularity.
8.1 Experimental setup
We use the same simulator and consider the same initial
settings as in Section 3, except that to better abstract
the effects of dynamic file popularity, we only consider
one swarm with decreasing popularity. The simulation
starts with one injector, who stays in the swarm as
a permanent seeder. In successive cycles, new peers
arrive according to an exponentially decreasing arrival
rate (λ(t) = λ0e
− t
τ ), a peer arrival pattern that has
been observed in many BitTorrent swarms [17]. Each
peer joins the swarm with zero upload and download
amounts. After a peer finishes its download, it seeds, if
necessary, until it achieves its target threshold.
By default, we set 30% peers to be over-seeding. As
shown in Section 6, this percentage is typical for showing
the effects of SRE. We choose λ0 = 10 and τ = 300 and
we run the simulation for 2000 cycles. All together 3000
peers are included. We have also tested different values
for λ0 and τ , which give very similar results.
8.2 The effects of SRE under dynamic file popular-
ity: arrive sooner to avoid long seeding time
We first demonstrate the effects of SRE under dynamic
file popularity. Note that a smaller peer ID means an
earlier arrival time. As shown in Fig. 11(a), after the
first 30 cycles, the swarm is occupied with hundreds of
seeders but only with very few leechers. The presence of
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Fig. 13. Supply-based price under dynamic popularity.
existing seeders increases the difficulty for a new seeder
to achieve its target threshold and leave the swarm, and
vice versa. We term this as cumulative seeder effect. As
a consequence, peers that arrive later experience much
longer seeding times. As shown in Fig. 11(b), to achieve
the target thresholds, the first 500 peers only need to
seed tens of cycles. After this, the seeding time increases
quickly to hundreds or even thousands of cycles.
8.3 Proposed strategies under dynamic popularity
As stated in Section 7.2, SRE with counting seeding
time and SRE with supply-based price achieve the best
performance in alleviating the side-effects of SRE. In this
section, we evaluate their performance under dynamic
file popularity.
We see from Fig. 12 that SRE with counting seeding
time dramatically alleviates the oversupply: except for
the large number of seeders during the first 200 cycles,
the instantaneous number of seeders is almost always
under 100. Without the oversupply, the seeding times of
all peers are also dramatically decreased to less than 100
cycles. And as shown in Fig. 13, SRE with supply-based
price effectively stabilizes the supply: the instantaneous
number of seeders stays stable after 200 cycles. With this
constant supply (and not oversupply), peers experience
much shorter seeding times compared to adopting the
original SRE. Meanwhile, peers who arrive too early
or too late have relatively longer seeding times than
other peers. The former case is due to the high price for
downloading when the swarm is occupied with much
more leechers than seeders; in the latter case, few new
peers arrive and the lack of demand increase the seeding
time.
9 RELATED WORK
This paper is based on two previous papers [10], [18]
with extensions including demonstrating detailed mea-
surement results, unifying the analysis of SRE-based
and credit-based private communities, analyzing the
systemic risk of SRE-based private communities, as well
as the influence of swarm popularity.
Several P2P incentive schemes based on credits have
been proposed in the literature. Vishnumurthy et al. [20]
present a system involving a virtual currency called
Karma, whose amount in the system is maintained to
avoid inflation and deflation. Kash et al. [11] show that
10
in a scrip system where agents can consume and pro-
duce services, both an overabundance of money supply
and its shortage lead to inefficiency. They also consider
hoarders and how to optimize the credit supply. Our
work is different in that we apply multiple user behav-
iors rather than focusing only on one that optimizes the
utility. In addition we focus on detecting and avoiding
extreme crashes and crunches.
As stated, for grounding our work we chose the realm
of private communities. Chen et al. [7] compare 13 pri-
vate communities with 2 public ones and show their dif-
ferences in torrent evolution, user behaviors, and content
distribution. Liu et al. [15] also perform measurement
studies and further develop a model to show that SRE
indeed provides effective incentives, but is vulnerable
to collusion. Andrade et al. [5] focus on the dynamics
of resource demand and supply, and they show that
users typically try to increase their contribution lev-
els by seeding for longer and not by providing more
bandwidth. However, our paper shows that providing
limited bandwidth is not the will of users, but it is a
consequence of the oversupply. Chen et al. [8] also notice
the oversupply problem and provide a model to identify
the optimal stable SLR range. However, they did not
propose strategies to solve the problem. Kash et al. [12]
demonstrate that in a private community named DIME,
after a period of freeleech, there are more download
activities in the community. This is consistent with our
theoretical result that during a pre-crunch state, injecting
credit will increase the system throughput. While these
papers mainly perform measurement-based studies, our
paper is based on measurement, theoretical model, as
well as extensive simulations. Further, we propose new
strategies that effectively alleviate SRE’s negative effects.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied the effects of credit-based
and SRE-based incentive policies employed in private
P2P communities, from both the system-level and the
user-level performance perspective.
Based on two user behaviors abstracted from real
world observations, i.e., lazy-seeding and over-seeding,
we examine the system-level credit dynamics and show
that crunches and crashes can easily happen in private
communities. We apply a theoretical analysis to charac-
terize the conditions that lead to these extreme outcomes,
based on which we design an adaptive credit interven-
tion mechanism that proactively stops the system from
seizing by temporarily changing the credit policies. A
system that is predicted to crunch allows freeleech, and
conversely, a system that is predicted to crash imposes
freeseed. Simulation results show that our mechanism is
very effective in avoiding crunches and crashes.
Given a private community that is sustainable, we
further analyze its user-level performance. Our simula-
tion results show that under SRE, swarms tend to be
extremely oversupplied. Although achieving an increase
in the average downloading speed, the oversupply in-
duces undesired effects including low upload capacity
utilizations, extremely long seeding times, and an unfair
playing field for late entrants into swarms. We propose
four strategies to alleviate these problems. Particularly,
SRE with supply-based price maintains a system-wide
high downloading speed, achieves stable high upload
capacity utilizations, and reduces seeding durations by
three orders of magnitude as compared to the original
SRE. When then the adaptive intervention mechanism is
run in the background to check the extreme conditions
for crunches and crashed, the system is ensured to have
a high and sustainable performance.
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